Dear Betty’s Bay residents
Your kindness and commitment this past month have truly strengthened the backbone of our community. Thanks to your donations and hands-on support, our three vital services continue to thrive. It’s your spirit of giving and participation that fuels our collective resilience. We’re deeply grateful to walk this path with you.
Rooted in purpose. Rising in unity. This month, we honour the quiet strength of Betty’s Bay, where every act of service, every voice raised in care, builds the future we deserve. Thank you for walking this path with us.
KNOW YOUR BBRA
Executive Committee
- Wayne Jackson Chairman & Membership Stony Point
- Amund Beneke. Vice Chair & Engineering Sunny Seas
- Hannelie Coetzee Treasurer Stony Point
- 4. Julia Frylinck. Secretary Stony Point
Essential Services
- Rob Boyd. BEST Central
- Jorika Rabie. Fire and Rescue Stony Point
- Wayne Jackson Sea Watch; Neighbourhood Watch Stony Point
- Elsa Stofberg Conservation Stony Point
Community Services
- Abigail Davids. Community Development Central
- Shameez Joubert Markets Rondevlei
- Claudele Jackson Crassula Hall Stony Point
Communications
- Wendy Lucas Website custodian Silversands
- Tersia Starke Website assistant Bass Lake
Oversight
- Andre Kotze Rondevlei Rep Rondevlei
- Calan Bennett Central Rep Central
Please visit our website to engage with the appropriate portfolio leaders regarding areas of your interest. We welcome your suggestions for improvements to enhance our processes, foster progress and promote a positive work environment.
There are two big talking points on the go – the Overhills development plan and the proposed e-voting system. I will unpack the current plan as presented and give my thoughts on the e-voting system.
THE PROPOSED OVERHILLS LOW-COST HOUSING DEVELOPMENT IN KLEINMOND
Background
GNEC is facilitating the Basic Assessment process for listed activities triggered under the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA).
Listing Notice 1; Activity: 12, 19, 24 & 27
Listing Notice 3; Activity: 4, 12 & 14
The proposed development site is located on the urban edge of Kleinmond.
The development area is currently partially occupied by an informal settlement, an electrical substation, a waste transfer station and a sports field.
Current zoning- Public Open Space & Special Use Zoning.
Proposed Development Site
77 Single Residential Units (0.61ha)
7 Less Formal Development Zones (4.48 ha)
Public Open Space (0.30 ha)
Electrical Powerline (0.44 ha)
Sports Field (2.19 ha)
Detention pond (0.38 ha)
Electric Substation (0.53 ha)
TRA (0.83 ha)
Taxi rank (0.09 ha)
First Public Participation Period (PPP) (16 May 2025-3 July 2025):
Executive Summary Documents were hand delivered – within 100 meter radius from subject property boundary.
Notification letters were sent via electronic mail to potentially affected state departments, NGO’s and commenting authorities.
Four sets of site notices were fixed along the boundary of the site.
Advertisement was published in the Hermanus Times as well as the Overstrand Herald newspaper.
BAR and associated documents were made available on GNEC’s Website.
All comments/ registrations received from Interested and Affected Parties (I&APs) were captured on a stakeholder database.
Studies/Assessments undertaken
Botanical Impact Assessment – Paul Emms
Freshwater Impact Assessment – FEN
Traffic Impact Assessment – Douw Lourens
Geotechnical Investigation – GAWC
Freshwater impact assessment
The freshwater study for the proposed Overhills housing development looked at the streams and wetlands on the site to see how they might be affected. Two main water features were identified.
A drainage line (small stream) along the western edge of the site. This stream has already been heavily changed by past activities like dumping and excavation, but it still plays an important role by carrying water through the area to wetlands further south.
A wetland in the south-western corner of the site. This wetland is in better condition and helps with controlling erosion, supporting biodiversity, and supplying water to the environment.
The study found that if the development goes ahead with the right safeguards, the risk to these water systems will be low. The safeguards include:
Keeping a buffer zone (at least 22 metres) around the wetland where no building can take place.
Not piping the small stream but rather rehabilitating it into a green, vegetated channel (called a bioswale) that can clean and slow down stormwater before it moves downstream.
Setting aside open space to protect the wetland.
Actively removing alien invasive plants and keeping them under control.
Making sure stormwater systems use sustainable designs to prevent flooding, erosion, and pollution.
Applying strict management during construction to avoid spills, erosion, and unnecessary damage.
In conclusion, the specialist says that the housing development can go ahead from a freshwater perspective, as long as the mitigation measures are strictly followed. The project even creates an opportunity to improve the current state of the drainage line and to better protect the wetland for the future.
Botanical impact assessment
The study area falls within Kogelberg Sandstone Fynbos, a Critically Endangered ecosystem, and contains patches of intact, sensitive natural vegetation
A vulnerable plant species, Serruria rubricaulis, was found on site, making the area especially important for conservation
The assessment warns that the proposed retention pond overlaps with sensitive habitat and would destroy this plant population unless it is relocated
Even with relocation, the project could still cause “edge effects” such as trampling, dumping, and fire risks to the remaining vegetation
The development is considered acceptable only if sensitive areas are avoided, the retention pond is moved and strict management is in place.
Traffic impact statement
The traffic study for the Overhills housing development shows that the project will have a moderate impact on traffic, but the road network will still function well with some safety improvements.
All intersections in the area currently work well, and they are expected to continue operating at good levels even after the Overhills project is completed.
The development will add some extra traffic during peak hours, but this will only slightly increase delays at intersections.
For safety reasons, a dedicated right-turn lane is recommended on Main Road at the intersections with Fynbos Street / IJ Singleton Street and with the Transfer Station access road.
The project will generate a significant number of pedestrian trips, so new surfaced sidewalks are recommended:
- along Main Road to connect to the proposed taxi rank,
- along the southern internal road through Overhills to link with GM Siyoni Street,
- and along GM Siyoni Street, Nemesia Avenue (west) and Fynbos Street, to ensure safe and continuous pedestrian routes.
Parking will be provided in line with municipal requirements.
Technical documents
Civil & Electrical Services Report – Lyners Consulting Engineers
Stormwater Layout – Lyners
Stormwater Management Report – BNC Engineering
Town Planners – Urban Dynamics Western Cape
Statutory process
Submit land use application to OM: Sept / Oct 2025
Processing of application: October 2025
Public participation: Nov / Dec 2025
Responses & mitigation: Jan – Feb 2026
Planning decision: Aug 2026
Key issues identified
- Infrastructure and Service Delivery
Overburdened Systems & lack of infrastructure upgrades.
- Environmental and Ecological Impact
Threat on Biodiversity
Encroachment and Illegal Expansion
Noise, Litter, and Visual Impact
- Public Participation and Transparency
- Social Issues and Crime
Crime and Lawlessness, safety threats and concerns over control and enforcement
- Lack of Employment and Economic Opportunities
Job Scarcity, High Unemployment Rates
Tourism at Risk
- Housing Demand and Misuse
Misallocation of RDP Homes
Unregulated Shack Growth
Lack of Beneficiary Vetting
- Procedural and Governance Concerns
Distrust in Municipality
- Alternatives Suggested
Other Locations
Upgrade Existing
Build Where Jobs Are
- Cultural and Property Concerns
Loss of Tranquillity
Property Devaluation
Long-standing Locals Overlooked
- Proposed Development Layout Criticisms
Buffer Zones
Unrealistic Phasing
ELECTRONIC VOTING (E-VOTING) IN SOUTH AFRICA: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
1.Opening statements
1.1 Conclusion: Under the ANC’s rule, with its history of looting and impunity, e-voting could become a tool for electoral fraud, not fairness. South Africa should fix its governance first before going digital.
1.2 E-voting can work in countries with strong institutions, transparency, and cybersecurity measures (like Estonia). However, in nations with weak governance, corruption, or poor infrastructure (like Venezuela or DRC), it can undermine democracy. South Africa must ensure independent oversight, verifiable backups, and public trust before implementing e-voting.
- Arguments FOR Electronic Voting:
2.1 Increased accessibility where E-voting can make voting easier for remote or disabled voters, increasing participation.
2.2 Faster results as automated counting reduces delays in announcing election outcomes.
2.3 Reduced human error which eliminates manual counting mistakes that occur with paper ballots.
2.4 Cost efficiency and long-term savings on printing, transporting, and storing paper ballots.
2.5 Modernization, aligns with global digital trends, making elections more efficient and transparent if implemented correctly.
- Arguments AGAINST Electronic Voting:
3.1 Cybersecurity risks and vulnerable to hacking, malware, or external interference, undermining election integrity.
3.2 Lack of verifiability, unlike paper ballots, digital votes may leave no physical audit trail, making recounts difficult.
3.3 Technical failures like power outages, software bugs, or hardware malfunctions could disrupt voting.
3.4 Digital divide. Disenfranchises or marginalised voters without access to technology or digital literacy.f
3.5 Potential for Fraud from insider threats or manipulation of software could alter results undetected.
4. Scenario for invalid results and fraud risks: What Could Go Wrong?
4.1 Manipulation of software. If the e-voting system is compromised (e.g., via malware or insider tampering), votes could be altered without detection.
4.2 Lack of transparency. If the system is proprietary (owned by a private company), the public cannot verify its integrity.
4,3 Voter coercion. Remote e-voting (e.g., internet voting) allows voters to be pressured by others since voting is not done in a controlled environment.
- How Easy Is Fraud?
5.1 Moderately difficult but possible. If proper safeguards (end-to-end encryption, paper backups, open-source software) are not in place, fraud could be committed by hackers, election officials, or foreign actors.
5.2 Example of fraud risk: In the 2019 Democratic Republic of Congo elections, e-voting machines were accused of pre-programming results, leading to widespread distrust and prote
- Examples of E-Voting Success and Failure.
6.2 Success: Estonia and why It worked:
6.2 Uses blockchain technology for secure online voting.
6.3 Voters can verify their votes, and results are auditable.
6.4 High trust in government and strong digital infrastructure.
- Failure: Venezuela and why It failed:
7.1 Smartmatic (the e-voting provider) admitted that results were tampered with in the 2017 election.
7,2 Lack of transparency and audits led to widespread distrust and claims of dictatorship.
7.3 The system was controlled by the government, with no independent oversight.
- Mitigating risks in South Africa’s E-Voting implementation: South Africa faces unique challenges in adopting electronic voting, including cybersecurity threats, unequal digital access, political distrust, and logistical constraints. To ensure a credible and secure e- voting system, the following risk-mitigation strategies should be considered:
8.1 Ensuring cybersecurity and preventing hacking
8.2 Risks: Foreign interference, malware, insider tampering.
8.3 Mitigation strategies: Use Open-Source Software to avoid proprietary systems; allow independent experts to audit the code.
8.4 End-to-End encryption to secure data transmission to prevent interception.
8.5 Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and require biometrics or OTPs to verify voters.
8.6 Regular Penetration Testing. Hire ethical hackers to identify vulnerabilities before elections.
8.7 Air-Gapped systems. Keep vote-counting machines offline to prevent remote hacking.
8.8 Example: Brazil uses standalone e-voting machines with no internet connection, reducing hacking risks.
- Maintaining a verifiable paper trail
9.1 Risks: No way to audit or recount digital votes if fraud is suspected.
9.2 Mitigation Strategies:
9.2.1 Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). Print a paper receipt for voters to confirm their choice.
9.2.2 Mandatory Manual Audits. Randomly check paper records against digital results.
9.2.3 Hybrid system. Allow voters to choose between e-voting and paper ballots.
9.2.4 Example: India uses EVMs with VVPAT, ensuring results can be cross-checked.
- Preventing Voter Coercion & Fraud
10.1 Risks: Vote-buying, family/employer pressure, ballot stuffing.
10.2 Mitigation Strategies:
10.3 In-Person E-Voting Only (No Internet Voting). Remote voting increases coercion risks.
10.4 Secure polling stations. Ensure voting booths are private and monitored.
10.5 Real-time monitoring. Use CCTV (where feasible) to detect intimidation.
10.6 Example: The Netherlands abandoned internet voting due to coercion risks.
- Addressing the Digital Divide
11.1 Risks: Disenfranchising rural/poor voters with no tech access.
11.2 Mitigation Strategies:
11.3 Phased rollout to test e-voting in urban areas first, then expand.
11.4 Offline E-Voting machines. Deploy secure devices to remote areas.
11.5 Voter education. Train citizens on using e-voting before elections.
11.6 Example: Namibia successfully introduced e-voting in 2014 but faced initial resistance from rural voters.
- Ensuring Transparency & Public Trust
12.1 Risks: Distrust in results due to lack of oversight.
12.2 Mitigation Strategies:
12.3 Independent audits. Allow political parties, NGOs, and observers to verify systems.
12.4 Live Results Tracking. Publish real-time data with cryptographic verification.
12.5 Legal Framework. Pass laws mandating e-voting safeguards and penalties for tampering.
12.6 Example: Switzerland allows public testing of its e-voting system before elections.
- Preparing for Technical Failures
13.1 Risks: Power outages, software crashes, hardware malfunctions.
13.2 Mitigation Strategies:
13.4 Backup Paper Ballots if machines fail, switch to manual voting.
13.5 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS). Ensure polling stations have backup power.
13.6 Emergency Protocols. Train staff to handle system failures.
13.7 Example: The Philippines had to revert to manual counting in 2010 due to e-voting machine failures.
- Preventing Insider Threats and Corruption
14.1 Risks: IEC officials or contractors manipulating the system.
14.2 Mitigation Strategies:
14.3 Decentralized Control. No single entity should have full system access.
14.4 Blockchain-Based Voting (Experimental) could provide tamper-proof records (but needs testing).
14.5 Strict Accountability. Prosecute any officials caught interfering.
14.6 Example: Kenya’s 2017 election was nullified due to alleged insider tampering with the e-voting system.
- Conclusion: Can E-Voting Work in South Africa? Yes, but only with strict safeguards:
15.1 Start with a pilot project (municipal by-elections first).
15.2 Mandate a paper trail for audits.
15.3 Ensure multi-stakeholder oversight (parties, civil society, IT experts).
15.4 Prioritize cybersecurity over speed or cost savings.
- Without these measures, e-voting could erode trust in South Africa’s elections, as seen in Venezuela and the DRC.
- Should South Africa adopt E-Voting Now?
- Assessing Risks Under ANC Governance & Systemic Corruption
18.1 Given South Africa’s high levels of political corruption, weak institutional oversight, and declining public trust, introducing e-voting at this stage would be extremely risky.
18.2 Here’s why:
18.3 The ANC’s Corruption Track Record Raises Red Flags
18.4 State Capture Legacy. The Zondo Commission exposed how the ANC manipulated state institutions (SARS, Eskom, NPA) for political gain.
18.5 Local Government Failures. Many ANC-run municipalities (e.g.Tshwane, Johannesburg) suffer from fraudulent tenders, collapsed services, and IT system failures, raising concerns about e-voting security.
18.6 No Consequences for Corruption despite scandals (e.g., Digital Vibes, PPE theft), ANC officials face little accountability. Could the IEC resist political pressure?
18.7 Risk: If the ruling party controls e-voting software or infrastructure, they could manipulate results covertly, just as they’ve manipulated tenders and SOEs.
18.8 South Africa’s Institutions Are Not Trusted to Safeguard E-Voting. IEC’s Independence Under Threat? While the IEC has been relatively credible, increasing ANC interference in Chapter 9 institutions (e.g., SABC, NPA) suggests it could be next.
18.9 Failed E-Government Projects. South Africa’s digital systems (Home Affairs, eFiling) are plagued by outages, hacking, and incompetence. E-voting would be a far bigger target.
18.10 Lack of Cybersecurity Capacity. The government has no proven track record of securing critical digital infrastructure (e.g., Transnet cyberattack 2021).
18.11 Risk: A hacked or manipulated e-voting system could lead to disputed elections, violent unrest, or a constitutional crisis.
18.12 Fraud Risks Are Higher in a Digitally Divided, Corrupt System
18.13 Digital Exclusion. Over 40% of South Africans lack internet access, and rural areas suffer from power cuts. E-voting could disenfranchise the poor.
18.14 Voter Coercion. In a country with high unemployment and patronage politics, e-voting (especially remote/online) could enable vote-buying or intimidation.
18.15 No Reliable Audit Trail. If the IEC rushes into e-voting without paper backups, fraud could go undetected.
18.16 Example: In Kenya’s 2017 election, the Supreme Court nullified results due to e-voting irregularities. South Africa could face worse chaos.
- Countries with Corruption Failed at E-Voting. SA Could Too
19.1 Venezuela’s ruling party rigged e-voting machines to declare fraudulent wins, destroying democracy.
19.2 DRC (2019). E-voting machines were accused of pre-programming results for Kabila’s allies.
19.3 Russia: “Electronic voting” in Moscow helped Putin steal opposition votes in 2021.
19.4 South Africa’s ANC has shown similar tendencies:
19.5 Cadre Deployment: Putting loyalists in key institutions.
19.6 Weaponizing Procurement: Tender fraud in every sector.
19.7 Silencing Whistleblowers: If e-voting fraud occurs, would the NPA investigate?
- Is There Any Way SA Could Do E-Voting Safely?
20.1 Not yet. But if the following strict conditions were met, a limited pilot project could be tested:
20.2 Paper Trail Mandatory. Every e-vote must have a verifiable paper receipt.
20.3 Open-Source Software. No secret algorithms; auditable by opposition parties & NGOs.
20.4 Multi-Party Oversight. All major parties (including DA, EFF) must have IT experts monitoring the system.
20.5 No Internet Voting. Only in-person e-voting machines (to prevent hacking/coercion).
20.6 Constitutional Safeguards. Laws criminalizing e-voting fraud, with harsh penalties.
20.7 But given ANC’s dominance and corruption, even these may not be enough.
- Final Verdict: South Africa Is NOT Ready for E-Voting. Current Risks Outweigh Benefits. Until corruption is curbed and institutions are truly independent, e-voting is a threat to democracy.
- Better Alternatives:
22.1 Upgrade current paper system (faster counting, better logistics).
22.2 Strengthen IEC’s independence from ANC interference.
22.3 Pilot e-voting in local by-elections first – only if safeguards are foolproof.
22.4 Questions for the E-Voting Roadshow Coordinator and the IEC in Ensuring Electoral Integrity: Will you ensure that…
22.5 Cybersecurity & Transparency
22.6 The entire e-voting software is open-source, allowing for independent audit by all political parties, civil society, and international experts?
22.7 Mandatory, voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) is produced for every single vote cast, to allow for manual recounts and audits?
22.8 The system is rigorously penetration-tested by independent, internationally recognized ethical hackers before every election and the results made public?
22.9 All voting machines are air-gapped (never connected to the internet) to prevent remote hacking?
22.10 The tender process for acquiring any e-voting technology is fully transparent, free from political interference, and awarded to a company with no links to the governing party or history of state capture?
23. Accountability & Oversight
23.1 A multi-party oversight committee, including opposition parties and civil society, has 24/7 access to monitor all aspects of the system’s code, logistics, and tabulation processes?
23.2 A strong legal framework is enacted first that mandates severe criminal penalties for any official or contractor caught tampering with the system.
23.3 The IEC’s independence is legally fortified to prevent any political pressure from the governing party or any other entity?
23.4 A full, simulated election is conducted and publicly demonstrated to prove the system’s integrity before it is used in a real vote?
24. Inclusivity & Access
24.1 The digital divide is addressed by guaranteeing that offline e-voting machines and backup paper ballots are available in all areas with poor connectivity, power instability, or low digital literacy?
24.2 A comprehensive, non-partisan voter education program is rolled out nationwide well in advance of any e-voting election?
24.3 Remote or internet voting is completely off the table to prevent voter coercion and ensure voting occurs in a secure, controlled environment?
25. Contingency and Trust
25.1 Clear and tested emergency protocols are in place, including an immediate switch to paper ballots, in case of widespread technical failure or power outages?
25.2 The public can access, under PAIA (Promotion of Access to Information Act), all contracts, testing reports, and audit findings related to the e-voting system?
25.3 The system is piloted in small-scale municipal by-elections first, with results meticulously verified against the paper trail, before any national rollout is considered.
25.4 The constitutional right to free and fair elections (Section 19) is prioritised above all cost-saving or speed benefits?
Wayne Jackson
Chairman